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1This paper was originally published in Methodology and Science, Volume 10,
1977, pages 64–79. It is now included in The Selected Works of Arne Naess, 
SWAN X, Springer, 2005. It is reprinted here with slight revisions. . Hard and Soft Methodology 
istorically, general methodological interest has concentrated on highly 
echnical and prestigious science, like theoretical physics. One expects 
o hear about Einstein and quantum physics rather than about the 
ethodology of questionnaires. The author of these notes belongs to 
hose who relish in reading about the wonderful achievements in 
hysics, cosmology, and related very “hard” fields of natural science. 
ut in the last five years, an increasing number of methodological 
dmirers of hard science have tried to do something meaningful in soft 
cience, more particularly in chaotic areas where science and politics 
eet; areas such as how to save some unpolluted nature and reserve 
ome possibilities for graceful and dignified life for our grandchildren. 
n these areas, such humble research instruments as questionnaires are 
mportant. Ordinary decent pro et contra dicere gets to be important. 
ethodology loses much of its scientific charm here. There are, 
owever, a vast number of important questions for the soft research 
ethodologists to tackle. 
 
he following notes are formed in close connection with a definite 
xample of a research project involving the development of a system of 
orms and hypotheses1 and also with commitment in a social and 
olitical activity, “the deep ecology movement.”2
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It is my contention that tentative formulation of normative systems is 
highly desirable in many kinds of activity, both purely theoretical and 
mixed theoretical, and pedagogical, ethical or political. They have so 
far received little attention. 
 
2. “Norms” and “Hypotheses” 
The sentences of normative systems are conveniently divided into two 
classes, those ending with a mark of exclamation, suggesting 
inducements to think or to act in certain ways, and those ending with a 
point, suggesting affirmations. The first I call norms, the second 
hypotheses. The latter name is chosen primarily to suggest testability, 
not uncertainty. Secondarily, the name suggests a certain tentativeness 
or reversibility. These characteristics hold also for norms, as we shall 
see from the methodology suggested in what follows. Even basic norms 
are revisable. It has been objected that the term “norm” and the sign of 
exclamation make the norm-sentences seem absolutistic and rigid. 
Actually, their main function is that of proposing tentative guidelines. 
Little is gained by a more complicated, relativistic terminology. 
Decisions—the aim of normative thinking—are absolutistic in the sense 
of being either carried out or sabotaged. 
 
3. Diagram Showing Top Levels of a Version of Systematization 1 
of Ecosophy T 
In order to avoid unnecessary abstractness I shall permit myself to 
introduce and elaborate in some detail a definite example. As a first step 
let me insert a diagram in the text. Explanations will follow in 
























Diagram 1 expresses a tentative synopsis, or condensed survey, of a 
philosophy inspired by the ecology movement. I call such a philosophy 
an ecosophy. My relation to this philosophy is complex: on the one 
hand, I am an adherent and contributor to its development; on the other 
hand, I am a researcher interested in critical thinking about systems and 
interested in methodology as such. 
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Saying that the diagram “expresses” a synopsis, this must be understood 
elliptically: as a drawer of the diagram, I intend to express the synopsis 
through certain sentences. But it is of course more or less unlikely that 
the sentences convey exactly the same to any reader. Certain 
approximations are all that can be expected.  
 
Modern ecology has been an inspiration to many ecologists and 
philosophers, and they, of course, do not arrive at the same results. In 
order to stress the possibility and even desirability of a diversity of 
tentative philosophies inspired by ecology, I name the system in 
Diagram 1 “Ecosophy T.” Here again I use a short-hand expression: 
Strictly speaking, no absolutely definite system is outlined. A set of 
sentences is offered. But plausible interpretations make up a class with 
more than one member. And my “definiteness of intention” is limited 
and constantly in flux. 
 
A philosophy may be systemized in many ways. There is no one 
definite way of tracing lines of derivation. It is to some degree arbitrary 
which norms and hypotheses are chosen as ultimate in the sense of not 
derivable. And even if the norms and hypotheses are arranged in a 
definite, authorized way, there is still room for differences in wording. 
Four sentences can be arranged in 24 ways through simple 
permutations. The classes of meaningful sequences of formulations of 
one single systemization I call “versions.”3 The diagram shows one 
single version. It is important to have the trichotomy, system, 
systematization, and version, in mind in what follows. There is a one-
many relation between the three items. 
  
4. Lower Norms in the Sense of Derived Norms  
The lines from top towards bottom of the diagram are meant to indicate 
derivations. The sentences lower down are meant to follow from those 
higher up. The “higher” norms are, however, not meant to have ethical 
or otherwise normative priority. They are not meant as more valid. The 
relations of levels are not axiological, but logical in a fairly wide 
sense—let us say as wide as in Spinoza’s “proofs.” The relation of 
higher to lower is often the rather trivial one of a more general to a less 
general norm or hypothesis. 
 
5. Use of Vagueness and Ambiguity to Achieve Multiple 
Interpretability 
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The terms and sentences (including the many one-word sentences) are 
strikingly vague and ambiguous. They are purposely open to a variety 
of different interpretations. 
 
There are serious methodological considerations that favour multiple 
interpretability. The highly tentative, “heuristic,” character of the 
survey has the character of an instrument of research, not a codification 
of results. It is made along the way, and modified along the way. 
 
Instead of tentatively rejecting one of the norms or hypotheses in favour 
of a completely different one, it is often better to introduce alternative 
interpretations of the initial or point of departure wording. The initial 
vague and ambiguous sentence expressing the hypothesis or norm may 
tentatively be given more precise meanings, resulting in new 
formulations called “precizations.” The concept of precization is one of 
the central concepts of a semantical subsystem, often called “empirical 
semantics.”4 Roughly, a sentence, s1, is more precise than another, s0, if 
and only if the latter (s0) permits all interpretations of the former, 
whereas the former (s1) does not permit all the interpretations of the 
latter (s0), and does not permit any interpretation of the more precise 
sentence is a genuine subset of that of the less precise. The choice of a 
rather indefinite and ambiguous sentence in the most elementary survey 
makes it fairly short and easily understandable and opens a large variety 
of different possibilities of more definite character. Instead of more or 
less arbitrarily insisting that a sentence is to be interpreted, say, in the 
way expressed by No. 249, and in no other way, options are kept open 
as long as this is heuristically convenient. Strictly speaking, the change 
of usage of words in No. 249 makes its meaning fluctuate in time and 
place. Openness is unavoidable. 
 
6. Function of One-Word Sentences and Other Primitive 
Utterances. “No Exploitation!” 
A striking feature of the survey is the large number of one-word 
sentences. Just who are considered the senders and who are the 
intended receivers of the survey, considered as a means of 
communication, is a problem. If considered to be a kind of blueprint for 
a general utopia of self realization, the intended receiver is humankind 
at large. Humankind does not read, however. More concretely, the 
intended receivers may be conceived as “the economically well-to-do in 
the industrial societies,” and the sentences announce to them which 
norms should be followed and which goals (values) should be 
attempted and realized through changes of their society. 




Thus conceived, the wording of one of the norms can be made more 
precise, as follows: T0, No exploitation!; T1, You (economically well-
to-do in the industrial societies) work to, or support attempts to, 
eliminate economic and other kinds of exploitation. T1 is more precise 
than T0 in one direction of precization, namely the receiver directed, but 
the ambiguous term “exploitation” is still made use of. 
  
What is exploitation? Evidently there is room for further precization. 
But, a highly precise sentence of the kind needed in a fairly abstract and 
general survey is apt to be very long and very complicated. Therefore, it 
cannot perform the special function of the less precise. The elaboration 
of the more definite, less vague and ambiguous survey of a system does 
not make the less definite and more vague and ambiguous valueless. We 
have to work continuously at various levels of preciseness. Various 
degrees of multiple interpretability are needed. 
  
The survey has six vertical levels and, at the top, there is only one 
norm. With only one top norm we eliminate the complication of rules of 
priority in case of norm collisions among any larger set of top norms. 
On the other hand, the choice of only one norm that is not derivable 
from other norms, involves a fair amount of word magic or more-or-
less arbitrary rules of interpretation. The term “self-realization” carries 
an inordinately heavy burden! 
  
If we put up, let us say, 10 top norms, this makes it necessary to decide 
upon a great number of rules of priority. In general, the maximum 
realization of ni is not compatible with maximum satisfaction of nj (i 
and j taking the values 1, 2, 3 . . .  10) or the maximum effort to realize 
ni. To regulate the relations between ni and nj a vast number of rules 
may be needed. 
 
7. Some Interpretations of “Self-Realization”  
Given different interpretations (in the sense of precization) of the term 
“self-realization,” the whole survey will get different meanings. Some 
derivations will not hold for some interpretations. In spite of this 
dependence upon one single term, it will not be wise to assign to it a 
definite meaning. The choice must, to some extent, depend on which 
derivations are considered valid and important. Thus the interpretation 
of the top norm sentences and of the others of the version is a 
continuous process, where tentative modifications at one level interacts 
with tentative semantical modifications at others. 




The main semantical device used to adapt the term “self-realization” to 
ecosophy T is to distinguish three concepts: 
 
 T0 – self-realization 
 T1 – ego-realization 
 T2 – self-realization (with ordinary s) 
 T3 – Self-realization (with capital S) 
  
The last kind of concept is known in the history of philosophy under 
various names, the “universal self,” “the absolute,” ātman a.s.f. Many 
Indo-European languages use terms corresponding to the English “self” 
in analogous ways. Thus, the Sanskrit ātman is used for all three 
concepts, but mostly as a simple reflexive pronoun. 
  
In prevalent individualistic and utilitarian political thinking in modern 
Western industrial states, the terms “self-realization,” “self-expression,” 
and “self-interest” are used for what is above called “ego-realization” 
and “self-realization,” One stresses the ultimate and extensive 
incompatibility of the interests of different individuals. In opposition to 
this trend there is another, which is based on the hypothesis of increased 
compatibility with increased maturity of the individuals. The 
compatibility is considered to have an ontological basis (compare with 
the “illusion” of a separable ego). The ecosophy T leans heavily on 
such ideas, excellently developed in the Ethics of Spinoza. Self-
preservation, or in our terminology, self-realization, cannot develop far 
without sharing joys and sorrows with others or, more fundamentally, 
without the development of the narrow ego of the small child into the 
comprehensive structure of a Self that comprises all human beings. The 
ecological movement—as many earlier philosophical movements—
takes a step further and asks for a development such that there is a deep 
identification of individuals with all life. 
  
The development of life forms, especially since the Cambrian period, 
shows an extreme degree of expansion of life space and a 
corresponding diversity of forms making use of different climatic and 
other conditions. There is no merely passive adaptation, no mere self-
preservation in any narrow sense. Thus, the term self-expression, or  
-realization is better suited than self-preservation. If the term “self” is 
felt to be unfitting, we can use “life unfolding” or “life expansion.” 
  
Whereas the top sentences, both norms and hypotheses in our survey, 
are somewhat metaphysical, the next levels introduce crucial ecological 
terms: diversity, complexity, symbiosis. If a particular way of life is 
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such that different species or different communities must compete and 
struggle with each other merely to survive, conditions are worse than if 
they somehow can specialize, making use of each others’ activities, and 
thus “live and let live”; that is, practice symbiosis. The symbiotic 
coexistence as conceived in modern ecology does not exclude killing—
elk and wolves have lived in symbiosis, the wolves keeping the 
population of elk within a limit necessary to uphold good, not too 
competitive life conditions and stable elk communities. 
  
Other terms of course need elucidation. The main point, however, is 
that from the top norms and hypotheses, general ecological and 
ecopolitical principles are derived. Thanks to the normative aspect of 
the system it does not merely describe, but prescribes. Thus, we are 
able to take care of the social and political views within the 
international ecology movement, of which environmental concerns are 
only a part. 
 
8. Main Conclusions of Sections 1 to 7 
I have used many words in order to render some of the hypotheses of 
the survey understandable. I am not trying to persuade anybody of the 
tenability of the hypotheses! 
1. Systematizations of norms and hypotheses are needed in 
research motivated by pedagogical, ethical, political, or other 
large-scale movements. 
2. The systematizations visualize complicated logical, or more 
generally, cognitive relations between important clusters of 
prescriptions and descriptions. They bring to focus the basic 
premises and fundamental norms that guide concrete actions and 
minor research units having meaning only, or mainly, within a 
major normative framework. They help to unify and coordinate 
enterprises involving diverse groups and many persons. 
3. Systematizations as research instruments must be flexible and 
be expressed at various levels of preciseness and in alternative 
terminologies. A multiplicity of versions are needed, each 
adapted to special functions. 
4. Modifications can be carried out through reinterpretation of 
terms and sentences as well as through negating or modifying 
propositions. 
5. Whereas the simple categorical way of announcement of norms 
and hypotheses makes survey and derivation most simple, 
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assessment of degrees of uncertainty and qualifying phrases 
should be attached as notes and comments. 
 
9. Normative Systems: Role in Social and Political Context  
Now to say some words about the extrinsic or social use of a survey or 
synopsis; it has pronounced multiple uses in social contexts. Let me 
hold fast to the survey used in the deep ecology movement. 
  
The destruction of ecosystems due to population explosion, heavy 
industry, and other factors has made it necessary to reform laws and 
regulations of many kinds. For example: Whereas until recently, laws 
specified exceptions to general permission to kill wild animals, laws are 
now specifying exceptions to a general prohibition against killing or 
injuring. A corresponding development is going on in relation to wild 
plants. 
  
The reason given for all these prohibitions mostly specify narrowly 
utilitarian aspects of the crisis. Or they stress in more general terms the 
interconnection of human life conditions with those of other forms. But 
the strongest motivation among the most prominent advocates of a new 
attitude towards nature and its ecosystem has been more philosophical. 
They have struggled for the recognition of the intrinsic value, and the 
value-in-itself, of the various lifeforms, and the right, in principle, of all 
of them to blossom. The ecological movement in the West from the 
time of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring has been inspired by philosophy, 
and still is. The survey is a crude instrument with which the main, 
general outline of this philosophy can be codified. It is not that all 
participants in the movement need to subscribe to the same hypotheses 
and norms, but that they can verbalize their own convictions in relation 
to the survey. Very few of the active participants have any special 
training in systematic expositions of a combined philosophical and 
scientific character. And the methodology of normative systems does 
certainly not belong to the curriculum of any traditional school. Thus, 
the survey facilitates reasoning and argumentation from first principles 
within the ecological movement—and of course, as a reaction within 
the groups who fight what they call the “prophets of doom.” 
 
10. Role of Arguing From First Principles in Technocracies 
Why is it so important in some western industrialized states to reason 
and argue from first principles? 
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One reason depends on a value judgment concerning technical 
expertise. I wish, therefore, not to mention it as a universally valid 
reason for argument from the first principles. 
  
The vast majority of experts with influence on the policy of western 
industrial states avoid argumentation from fundamentals. They prefer to 
state the preferences of the majority, or that which is in harmony with 
the stated goals of the democratically elected government. The goals 
are, in part, vaguely formulated through slogans such as “welfare” or, in 
more specific ways, defined as “continued economic growth,” “less 
than four per cent unemployment,” and so on. In any case, experience 
shows a marked unwillingness, perhaps sometimes combined with 
inability, to argue from fundamentals. 
  
Confronted with people from the deep ecology movement who argue 
from fundamentals, the experts are induced to do the same. This nearly 
always results in conclusions favourable to the movement. It exposes 
the absence of argumentation from fundamentals that is a necessary 
condition of short-sighted, unecological policies. When such 
argumentation is introduced, inconsistencies appear between basic 
norms and hypotheses and current policies. Personally, on the whole or 
very often, the experts have the same basic value commitments as those 
in the ecology movement. But their public function is primarily to help 
realize goals not stated by them, but by some other authority and 
backed by powerful special interests. Less powerful interests cannot 
afford to hire the experts. 
  
Through argumentation from fundamentals, the experts are pushed into 
controversial issues, and are led to criticize unecological policies and 
their own bosses. Thus, the more clear and explicit the argumentation 
from fundamentals among supporters of responsible ecological policies, 
the greater the possibilities of introducing such argumentation among 
policy makers. 
  
These hypotheses about the increase of possibilities do not imply any 
definite level of influence. It is easy to overestimate the influence of 
arguments in politics. The impact of ecological thinking upon policies 
has been slight compared to what ecologists think is necessary to 
prevent catastrophic conditions within a single century from now. And 
if such argumentation is introduced, it favours, on the whole, the goals 
of responsible ecological policies. But this is perhaps too much talk 
about the ecology movement, especially with the use of unclarified, 
value-laden expressions such as “responsible” ecological policies! Let 
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us inspect the survey considered at a point of departure formulation—a 
“T0-formulation”—of the uppermost levels of a normative system. 
 
 
11. Preponderance of Non-Normatives in a Normative System 
Some elementary observations: 
1. A normative system does not consist only of norms. Most 
codifications of normative views show a marked preponderance 
of non-normative sentences. 
2. Norms are, in general, derived from other norms and 
hypotheses, not merely from norms. 
3. The existence of at least one hypothesis as a premise for the 
inference of a norm, establishes the hypothetical character of 
derived norms. Their validity depends on the validity of non-
normative assumptions, postulates, theories, observations. 
  
Methodologically, the last point is of decisive importance in 
argumentation: when the intricate interconnections between norms and 
hypotheses are left unarticulated, each norm tends to be taken to be 
absolute or ultimate. This eliminates the possibility of rational 
discussion. In harmony with the methodology here proposed, it is 
always, when norms are opposed in debate, appropriate to ask the 
opponent: Which hypotheses do you think are relevant to the adoption 
of your norm? 
  
If experts refer to public opinion in support of a norm, it is today 
important both to ask for evidence in the form of published 
investigations of opinions, and for norms justifying the derivation of a 
norm from descriptions of opinions, whether they are those of a 
majority or an authoritative minority. Opinions are unfortunately 
reported as if they can be isolated from (implicit) normative systems. A 
survey concluded that three out of four Norwegians think that the 
Norwegian standard of living is too high, 28 per cent even “much too 
high” and only one per cent too low. Supporters of economic growth 
contended that a different way of asking would show that a lesser 
majority are against present average high standard of living. Subsequent 
surveys proved this. But it is plausible that a “deep interview” covering 
fundamental norms and hypotheses would indicate that more than three 
out of four think that the standard is too high. What is needed for 
methodological purposes is the use of a substantial number of different 
systemic contexts. As it is, different political parties use only one 
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questionnaire for each survey and form the questions in a way that is 
not unfavourable to the party line.  
 
 
12. Ultimate Norms: The Equal Right to Live and Blossom 
The term “ultimate norm” is used mainly in two senses, “norm not 
derived from any other norm” and “norm of highest priority” (or “of 
absolute, unconditioned priority”). In normative systems of the kind 
envisaged only the first sense is used. In that case, there is a rational 
methodology for changing an ultimate norm. Any proposal for 
ultimateness will fundamentally have the character of a working 
hypothesis. 
  
Given a consistent set of norms and hypotheses there is in principle a 
plurality of possibilities of deriving them from a less numerous set. It 
primarily involves a process of generalizations. If the ultimate norm 
concerns adult humans, it may be generalized to make it concern all 
living beings with certain characters, determining the traits in a way 
that one can infer that all adult humans fall within the range of intended 
validity, but that others also might fall within that range. Whether we 
believe that there actually are such beings (e.g., angels, Martians) is not 
relevant to the previous question of derivation. We would get an 
ultimate norm from which the previous ultimate norm concerning adult 
humans is derived. 
  
The more frequent source of change of an ultimate norm is, however, 
the derivation of a (non-ultimate) norm that we are certain we will not 
accept as valid. It must be remembered that a systemization is a 
methodological device made by certain persons for certain purposes. It 
has no independent authority.  
 
If, for instance, from “All living beings have equal right of self 
realization” is taken to be derivable from the ultimate norm “Complete 
self realization,” and “If your little daughter has an extreme hunger, and 
food can only be brought to her by killing the last tiger, nevertheless do 
not kill it” can be derived from “All living beings have equal rights” 
(plus some hypotheses of unquestioned validity), then some of us would 
tend to reject the ultimate norm. That is, we might say, “It is my duty to 
rescue my child, whatever the consequences for the tigers.” (But not 
whatever the consequences for my human neighbour, that is, it is not 
my duty to kill him, even if he were the only food available for my 
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daughter.) The rejection of an ultimate norm has normally a kind of 
intuition as one of its presuppositions. 
 
The principle of equal right for all living beings to blossom is at the 
moment controversial, but there seems to be a rising opinion in its 
favour. In order to avoid undesired consequences, especially in our 
world of increasing famine, the necessary injuring and killing of 
animals for food must be admitted through special hypotheses and 
norms. These have to do with mutual aid among beings of the same or 
similar kinds. There are obvious advantages for a species in which 
parents take special care of their offspring, and in which kindred beings 
take special care that may be obnoxious to “out” groups. Exactly where 
is the line to be drawn? Obviously, there cannot be general agreement 
here, and attempts to codify detailed norms covering all sorts of norm-
collisions are unrealistic and methodologically unjustified. There is, 
however, a movement towards establishing a norm against “inflicting 
unnecessary pain of injury to animals.” What is here meant by 
“necessary”? It obviously depends on a complex structure of norms and 
hypotheses. 
 
Clarification of concepts of “natural right” has never been very 
successful. Clarifying the egalitarian norm under consideration, I 
propose that a stipulation of definitional rule is added: “The right of A 
to live and blossom does not automatically exclude the justification of 
B to injure or kill A.” In order to avoid confusion, I would not say B 
may have the right to kill; there are many kinds of justification other 
than through a so-called “natural right.” 
 
13. De Principiis est Disputandum 
Now back to our consideration of norms placed as ultimate in a 
normative systemization. From the above, it follows that the rule de 
principiis non est disputandum does not hold. Every proposal of 
ultimate norms is open to discussion. And the critical assessment can 
take many forms: non-acceptance of consequences, invoking norms 
from which the proposed ultimate norm can be derived, and other 
argumentative moves. 
 
14. Team Work and Action Research 
Hypotheses of central importance in an ecosophy exhibit an extremely 
wide range of subject matter, from quantum mechanics to political 
science and theory of communication. Team work is therefore essential 
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in every ecosophical research, however modest. There are no specialists 
in ecophilosophy. The research project resulting in the systemization 
illustrated in this paper comprises teamwork. The members are in 
constant touch with a very wide circle of researchers and participants in 
political and social struggles. This makes the research, to some extent, 
manifest the character of action research. 
 
Action research has acquired a bad reputation among stern 
methodologists who favour the hard natural sciences. This is 
unfortunate because an increasing number of high quality research 
problems have time limitations. The researchers get to know the dates 
say d1, d2 . . .  d10, as approximate dates of social and political decisions 
with grave ecological consequences. The researchers are asked to 
furnish evidence for or against certain crucial hypotheses before 
definite dates. Genuine questions of scientific methodology are specific 
to this unfortunate situation: the researcher has to solve the maximation 
problem of how to arrive at a maximum of evidence for or against a 
hypothesis given limited resources, the severest limit being available 
time. Furthermore, the researchers have to accept modifying or 
reshaping the project after each political decision. Team-work is 
essential because of the many shifts of relevance from one kind of 
subordinate problem to another. 
 
The ecologically relevant researchers concerning atomic energy 
installations are typical: safety investigations require atomic physicists, 
chemists, and engineers in the hard sciences; consequences for 
vegetation, fisheries, and so on require soft natural science participants; 
the “human error” factor requires people with social and psychological 
competence; and the political implications (plutonium in the hands of 
an increasing number of governments, increased centralization, etc.) 
also require researchers in many social an humanistic fields. Therefore, 
all are subject to merciless requirements of priorities. Every relevant 
question may open interesting investigations that might take 100 years 
and require the total material resources available. 
 
The bad reputation of action research is mainly the result of two defects 
and one good thing: the uncertain character of certain hypotheses is not 
formulated with sufficient emphasis in research reports or in 
popularized forms in mass communication; the researchers plead a 
cause in a way that hampers the utilization of their information by 
people of different opinions; and action research sometimes strikes 
narrow, vested interests that then hit back, trying to discredit action 
research as a whole. 
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Whereas military action research in established sciences of nature has 
been going on for a long time without the name being used, social 
science action research is new and must be expected to meet opposition. 
It is of great importance that it is led by researchers with some 
experience; otherwise valuable contributions can be misused or 
neglected because of flaws in the way they are presented to the public. 
An example, a government institution involved in the efforts to protect 
forests hired scientists to report on different aspects, one of which was 
recreation. A young team investigated the conception people have of a 
forest and what they expect and wish to experience in the forest. The 
public clearly expected and wished for diversity in the ecological sense. 
Those who have economic interests on the whole favour monocultures, 
broad highways for transportation, and other features that are 
ecologically undesirable. A hot public debate resulted, and the papers 
written by the young scientists were heavily criticized. Some of the 
criticism could have been avoided if they had foreseen the clash 
between opposite interests. In short, in action research the participants 
should be generalists, with a field of study covering the question of how 
a scientific report is likely to be read and made use of or attacked by 
various power groupings. Theory of communication and political 
science is relevant whatever the special topic of an action research 
project. 
It is my hope that the present paper may inspire some friends in the 
field of “hard” methodology to shift towards the broad fields of “soft” 
methodology. Their general attitude of concern for “objectivity” may 
contribute to being fair and unbiased, which is so important in the hot 
conflicts surrounding present day social and political problems. 
Notes 
                                                 
1 Norwegian National Research Council, project A79.24-15. 
2 Some of the authors of central importance to the deep ecology movement are 
Gregory Bateston, Kenneth Boulding, Ottar Brox, Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner, 
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trichotomy theory/systemization/version as used in this article, see Arne Naess, The 
Pluralist and Possiblist Aspect of Science, Chapter 3. (Now SWAN IV, Springer 
2005.) – For definiteness of intention see Communication and Argument, p. 34 et seq. 
4 For a short exposition see Arne Naess, Communication and Argument, London & 
Oslo, 1966. For more technical treatment see Interpretation and Preciseness, Oslo 
1953. (Now SWAN I and VII, respectively, Springer 2005.) 
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